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RESUMEN: Sobre la naturaleza espacial de las instituciones y la naturaleza institucional de las redes personales
en el Atlántico Español.- Los estudios de las redes comerciales, culturales y políticas en el Atlántico suelen contrastar
los lazos débiles de las redes con las reglas firmes de las leyes y regulaciones de comercio imperiales. Se presume
implícita o explícitamente que en el ámbito del Atlántico español las redes funcionaron fundamentalmente como antí-
doto de la organización del imperio trascendiendo sus limitaciones espaciales. Las redes se asocian con fluidez,
opuestas a las estructuras estáticas del estado y de la iglesia. En este artículo sugerimos que las redes no solamente
eran instituciones, sino también que las instituciones imperiales se deberían considerar como redes. Con el objetivo
de demostrar cómo nuestras interpretaciones de las interacciones entre redes mercantiles e instituciones cambian si
rompemos con la idea de una dicotomía entre las dos se analiza el caso de las redes atlánticas inglesas que se estable-
cieron en el norte de España en la primera mitad del siglo XVII.
PALABRAS CLAVE: redes; instituciones formales e informales; siglo XVII; mercaderes ingleses; País Vasco; consulados
Copyright: © 2014 CSIC. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
Non Commercial (by-nc) Spain 3.0 License.
I
The rise of Atlantic history and that of a distinct lit-
erature that could be described as the history of networks
coincide broadly in time from the late 1990s onwards.
The former was in its origin a thoroughly Anglo Amer-
ican enterprise and at least in part rightly criticised as
such (Hancock, 1995; Greene andMorgan, 2009; Bailyn,
2005; Games, 2008). Cynical observers argued from its
inception that Atlantic History especially as practiced
in North American academia was a rear guard fight of
historians of the nation state against the rise of global,
world and transnational history. At a time when many
history departments looked to diversify their traditionally
heavily US focused faculties, Atlantic History was
charged with being just one way, in which North-
Americanists could reinvent themselves and find a new
raison d’être.
To many scholars’ surprise, Atlantic history turned
out to be too dynamic to remain in its original habitat.
David Armitage’s widening of the concept into cis-At-
lantic, trans-Atlantic and circum-Atlantic Historiesmight
have struck some historians as one concept toomany.Yet,
italsobeautifullyillustratedthatoncehistorianshadstarted
to think outside traditional national boxes, there was no
turning back. Cis-Altantic crossings, comparisons either
side of the trans-Atlantic space and the history of circum-
Atlantic peoples in the Americas, Africa and Europe be-
came the subjects of studies that now also included Span-
ish, Portuguese, French and Dutch speakers. Even more
recentlyhistorianshavebegun togive (over-)dueattention
to Africans in the Atlantic as actors and not just as name-
less objects of the middle passage (Armitage, 2002). The
Atlanticwasanopen system that contained, but alsobroke
outofnational, imperialandcommoditybasedsubsystems
(Pietschmann, 2002). If Atlantic history was an attempt
to save US and British national historians from the chal-
lenges of globalisation it was a resounding failure. The
Genie of Clio has refused to go back into the bottle of the
reified nation state of old, no matter howmany historians
trained in the old ways wish it would. (Bell, 2013).
The historiography on networks has had a more
variegated lineage but most strands of it are intimately
linked to the history of the Atlantic. Mercantile networks
havehadprideofplace instudiesof trans-Atlanticconnec-
tions long before the label Atlantic history was applied
(Liss,1983;FernándezPérez,1997;Lamikiz,2010;Ewert
andSelzer,2001).WhileintheAnglophonehistoriography
studies of diasporas, i.e. religious, linguistic and/or ethnic
minorities, abound in Atlantic history, in the Iberian case
those have become prominent only more recently
(Trivellato, 2009; Zahedieh, 2010). Obviously the official
requirement for participation in the carrera de Indias of
being a natural of the kingdom of the Spains meant that
traders from elsewhere had to integrate into the
Seville/Cadiz networks (Álvarez Nogal, 2011). Closed
networks based on internal cohesion of a religious or lin-
guisticorprotonationalminority,saytheFlemishorDutch
traders at Seville, were always limited by their having to
work hand in hand with merchants of the carrera, or at
least with a native testaferro. (Crespo Solana, 2011). At
the same time, the role played by Basque, Navarrese and
laterCatalanmercantilenetworksof commonprovenance
has long been acknowledged (Priotti, 1996). The outsized
role of alignments along lines of peninsular origins in
Mexico has been stressed yet again by recent studies of
theeighteenthcentury(SteinandStein,2009;2000 2003).
At the same time,whowas a vecino (citizens) or a natural
(vassals of the Spanish kings) was only in exceptional
cases amatter of legal norms.Most of the time, acting like
a vecino constituted sufficient proof to become a vecino
in the eyes of local authorities, which were the ones that
couldconfirmthestatus(Herzog,2003).Thelinesbetween
foreigners and locals were therefore also more fluid than
often assumed complicating the notion of networks of
common provenance further. Meanwhile, research on re-
ligious minority networks of conversomerchants usually
described as the “Portuguese nation” has shed even more
light on the hybridity of Iberian societies in the Peninsula,
the Americas and Africa (Mark and Silva Horta, 2011;
Studnicki-Gizbert, 2007).1
The study of Atlantic networks has also transformed
how historians understand cultural exchange, the circu-
lation of knowledge, migration and, in particular, polit-
ical governance in the Hispanic World. Starting from a
critique of traditional models of the absolutist state,
historians have begun to conceive of monarchical gov-
ernment in early modern Europe as a persistent negoti-
ation between corporate powers, elite networks and the
monarch and his councils. Spain’s kings ruled through
networks of royal administrators and contacts in urban,
ecclesiastical and corporate bodies.2 The “King’s Men”
were the faces of a polity that had yet to become a fully
sovereign state. Their immersion in local society turned
them into the point of contact between powerful elites
in historic territories and Viceroyalties in the Americas
and Europe on the one hand, and the Monarchy on the
other.
The role of these individuals and their personal net-
works went far beyond the purely administrative. They
advanced funds to implement royal policies from naval
construction to military levies, and especially the collec-
tion of taxes (Harding and Solbes Ferri, 2012; Torres
Sánchez, 2002). They supplied troops and negotiated
peace. Their rewards came in the form of social advance-
ment as well as pecuniary benefits, asientos and other
commercial privileges, and beneficial marriage alliances
(Janssens and Yun Casalilla, 2005; Drelichman and
Voth, 2014). Their activities raise attention to the less
than monolithic nature of the early modern polity and
question established interpretations of the relationship
between networks and the state in the Spanish Atlantic.
Political networks typically relied on patronage and co-
operation rather than command. But they were as much
part of the state as the councils of the kings.
In the following section this paper will offer some
thoughts about the relationship between networks and
institutions in the Spanish Atlantic. In Section three it
introduces a case study, the transformation of institutions
and networks in the northern Spanish Atlantic trade.
The radical change in orientation and organisation of
the northern wool trade between the sixteenth and sev-
enteenth centuries could indeed be interpreted in a tradi-
tional juxtaposition of closed, monopoly based, mercan-
tilist trade organisation in the sixteenth century andmore
open networks in the seventeenth. However, section
four suggests a new interpretation that breaks down the
supposed antagonism between networks and institutions.
Section five concludes.
II
In historiography networks are often an answer to
the critique of an earlier legalistic institutional history.
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The common thread in studies of commercial, cultural
and political networks in the Atlantic is that they tend
to juxtapose the soft ties of networks to the hard rules
of imperial law and trade regulation. The implicit or
explicit assumption has thus been that networks in the
Spanish Atlantic served primarily as an antidote to the
organisation of empire. Networks stood for fluidity, as
opposed to the static structures of state and church. They
were vertically integrated, not hierarchical. Merchants
collaborated instead of establishing hegemony. They
had urban roots and resisted being drawn into territorial
state and empire building. They broke open the strict
spatial boundaries between incipient nations and across
empires. They obstructed, undermined and perverted
the attempts of states to regulate and control every aspect
of the economy. As the human face of commerce they
destabilised strict trade regulations and the power of the
mercantilist bureaucrats in the Atlantic world.
In a recent description of the role of the Portuguese
nation in Atlantic trade Studnicki-Gizbert sums up this
view . “The intimate scale, the number and the geograph-
ical spread of houses that composed a mercantile nation
precluded the kind of institutionalized and hierarchical
coordination characteristic of states and empires”
(Studnicki-Gizbert, 2007: 9). And he goes on to explain
that
Trade in the early sixteenth-century was deeply multina-
tional in character, a fact that points to the persistence of
medieval commercial structures organized around cities
rather than nation-states or empires. Whereas the most
visible apparatus of sixteenth-century colonial expansion
- the institutions of conquest, administration, and conver-
sion - was ultimately organized by the Castilian or Por-
tuguese Crown, enterprise were based in, and articulated
around, urban centers (Studnicki-Gizbert, 2007: 27).
Historians have tended to interpret Atlantic networks
as the flexible left-overs of late medieval urban trading
traditions that skilfully took advantages of the inconsis-
tencies of absolutist drive to regulate every facet of
economic and social life. Networks or nations were thus
one important reason why “[u]ltimately it proved im-
possible for the Spanish state to completely harness the
roving dynamismof anAtlantic economy in full econom-
ic expansion” (Studnicki-Gizbert, 2007: 30). Networks,
we are told, were able to take advantage of the early
form of capitalism that was well-established at the close
of the Middle Ages and which, we are supposed to
conclude, was orthogonal to the state-constrained com-
mercial structure of the carrera.
This widely echoed narrative relies on a set of as-
sumptions that are rarely examined in any detail. First,
it harks back to a notion of the Spanish Empire as a
centralising, powerful, absolutist, imperial machine at
least in ambition. Yet, this has long been exposed as
deeply problematic. The political organisation of las
Españas – contemporaries wisely employed the plural
until deep into the 18th century - was that of a polycentric
state (Grafe, 2012). Its most salient characteristic was
the flat hierarchies of location of power, visible in the
processes negotiation between several centres and across
the spatial extension of the Spains (Grafe, 2012). The
notion that colonial authorities in Oruro executed what
the Audiencia in Potosi asked them to do, which in turn
followed the command of a viceroy in Lima, who re-
ceived his instructions from the monarch and Councils
inMadrid is clearly erroneous. Officials at all levels and
in all branches of the administration were involved in
initiating, discussing, assessing and occasionally refusing
to apply what we think of formally as royal or viceregal
decrees.
Even leading bureaucrats with privileged direct ac-
cess to the inner circles of the polity were not just the
willing executioners of the monarch’s wishes. Gasch-
Tomas’ excellent research on the bargaining about the
regulation of the silk trade is exemplary in this context.
Institutions in three of the centres of the polycentric
reigns, Manila, Mexico and Seville negotiated over the
direction of flows of Chinese, Mexican and European
silks in the Atlantic and Pacific. Mexican viceroys were
initially against an expansion of the Pacific trade. Yet,
as soon as the Manila trade had become important for
theMexican merchant community, the viceroys of New
Spain became the staunchest allies of the local consu-
lado, eloquently defending Pacific trade against Seville’s
attempts to restrict it, and the royal hacienda’s efforts
to tax it (Gasch-Tomas, 2012: 231-239).
In these conflicts the king and his councils were the
ultimate arbiter between local elites rather than the
source of most of the legislation. This was true as much
in the peninsula as in the Americas (Irigoin and Grafe,
2008). Where the exercise of power relied on decentral-
ised networks as the administrators of the Empire, the
location of power was dispersed. Legislation, commer-
cial or otherwise, could effectively be initiated in any
institution and at every level of the administration. It
was often informed by what was deemed necessary in
the local context, and where there was resistance, the
King’s Men, like the viceroy of Mexico, often quite
happily impeded the application of locally unacceptable
decrees.
On closer examination it turns out that Studnicki-
Gizbert’s “institutions of conquest, administration and
conversion” should more correctly be described as
private networked enterprises of conquest with hardly
any involvement of the Monarchy, webs of administra-
tors with surprising degrees of local and regional power
of decision-making, and a church that was as much a
competitor for power, influence and tax incomes as an
ally of the monarchy. The Spanish Empire has often
been described as a paper tiger that could not enforce
the decrees that flowed to every corner of the Hispanic
reigns precisely because networks of foreign or local
merchants, unruly administrators or corrupt tax farmers
undermined its urge to control.What the recent literature
on political networks shows, however, is that it was
never meant to be a forceful centralised structure. Instead
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it was a complex administrative web of shared sover-
eignties and networks of power and influence that ulti-
mately relied on a process of negotiation in the local
context.
Second, the polycentric nature of the polity not only
contradicted any notion of a centralised, imperial admin-
istrative structure but also made sure that there was
never much room for mercantilism in early modern
Spain (Grafe, 2014). The Spanish commercial system
is still regularly described as a quasi “monopoly” by
historians. The loose use of the term “monopoly” in this
context is at least imprecise, at worst misleading. To
take the most famous example, the fleet system of the
Carrera de Indias mirrored the traditional organisation
of maritime long-distance trade with a staple port
(Seville/Cadiz), a convoy system for protection (flotas
and galeones) and a privileged position for merchants
of the guild (the consulado) who were licenced to parti-
cipate. However it maintained internal competition
between guild members in stark contrast to the English
or Dutch, which created proper monopolies through the
EIC and VOC.
The licensing system was more effective in guaran-
teeing a functioning market than early historians of the
carrera imagined.3 Jeremy Baskes uses the eventual
abolition of the system of fleets and staple ports in the
late eighteenth century as a way to assess their role. He
argues that merchants’ failing attempts to insure the
Spanish American trades after the end of convoys and
the proclamation of comercio libre in 1778 illustrate
that the rationale for convoying and therefore for a staple
port had been sound (Baskes, 2013). Insurance could
cover maritime risk, i.e shipwrecks or even piracy,
equally or better than convoys had done. Yet, the uncer-
tainty of market conditions in the Atlantic resulting from
poor information, shallow markets and wartime priva-
teering threatened to cripple commercial activity in the
absence of convoys. Indeed, when compulsory convoys
were abolishedmerchants desperately tried to put togeth-
er their own.
Baskes has concluded that even in the Bourbon
period there is little evidence that merchants either in
Cadiz or in Mexico enjoyed monopoly rents or acted as
a cartel. Others have made a similar argument about the
organisation of the carrera in the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries (Álvarez Nogal, 2011). It was not the
outcome of the regulatory mania of a mercantilist state
but an attempt to enable trade and maintain competitive
structures in the face of almost unsurmountable degrees
of uncertainty. Regulation was meant to create a market
in a condition of market failure not to suppress it.
What emerges from the recent literature on political
and commercial networks in the Spanish Atlantic is thus
a polity that seems less rigid in its institutional set-up
and a regulation of trade that was more responsive to
commercial realities than often assumed. In this light
the juxtaposition of a supposedly state-sponsored, mer-
cantilist and closed trading system and governance with
the flexibility of networks of provenance that ran circles
around the cumbersome official system increasingly
looks like a smokescreen. But how can we understand
the relationship between commercial and political insti-
tutions on the one hand and networks on the other
without relying on their supposed antagonism?
A look across the disciplinary divide towards the
social sciences can help to dissolve the smokescreen.
From an economist’s perspective all types of associ-
ations including nations and other merchant networks
were institutions. There are important nuances between
the “strength of weak ties” to use Granovetter’s path
breaking description of networks and that of formalised
institutions (Granovetter, 1982). Yet, the strict distinc-
tion between institutions (state, church, town, consulado)
and networks (of family, religious or provenance ties)
makes little sense from a social scientist’s perspective.
The difference between mercantile networks and the
institutions that for example underpinned the carrera
de Indias is simply that the former were overwhelmingly
informal and the latter formal (Greif, 2005).
Family bounds, nations, diasporas, guilds, consula-
dos, mercantile courts were all institutional responses
to what is known as the “fundamental problems of ex-
change”. Participants in exchange had to be willing to
commit ex-ante to a business deal and to be willing to
comply with the deal ex-post (Greif, 2000). This created
on the one hand a credibility problem. How could a
merchant in Lima convince a correspondent in Seville
or Cadiz that he was going to sell a shipment of goods
at the best possible price and remit the entire gain when
the merchant in the peninsula had little chance to mon-
itor his correspondent’s dealings? On the other hand,
this generated a compliance issue. How could the Lima
merchant be sure that the Cadiz trader would pay for
the wares he send?
Trust was built precisely around informal and formal
institutions. The importance of the work of Greif and
others is that they have shown the strength and weak-
nesses of different forms of organisation. Family mem-
bers were usually trusted more willingly but limited the
size of the network. They also often turned out to be not
the most able correspondents. Networks based on
provenance or socio-religious minority status offered
more diversity in terms of points of contact. But they
left merchants with serious issues of monitoring and
enforcement. Often referred to as “multilateral coali-
tions” in the economics literature they increased the in-
centive for members of the network to act in good faith
because members were in constant contact by letter.
Information about a cheating corresponding might thus
travel fast in the entire network. In other words, misbe-
haviour would be sanctioned not only by the betrayed
trading partner but presumably the dishonest trader
would be effectively frozen out of the entire network.
Nations and other informal networks were, however,
by far not a perfect way of monitoring good behaviour
and, if necessary, punishing dishonest conduct. The slow
movement of information in early modern trans-Atlantic
trade created such high degrees of market uncertainty,
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as Baskes has suggested, that conflict between traders
either side of the Atlantic more often than not resulted
from the grey zones of trade.While aMexicanmerchant
might be convinced a correspondent had taken a cut off
the sale of a shipment of dyestuffs, the Seville merchant
might have genuinely found himself trying to sell in a
glutted market. Commercial fraud was rarely a clear cut
story complicating the building of trust.
Members of the informal trans-Atlantic networks
that kept the Spanish trade going therefore relied on the
formal institutions of the mercantile courts of the consu-
lados or those of the temporal and even ecclesiastical
courts to protect their property rights. Family and other
networks were most of the time not an alternative to the
reliance on formal courts but a complement. Greif
showed that informal networks such as the medieval
MediterraneanMagribi traders could create self-sustain-
ing informal institutions that could effectively govern
their group’s trade (Greif, 1988). However, it is also
clear now that even these Jewish diasporas made use of
Muslim courts in certain circumstances (Goldberg,
2012).
To put it another way: informal and formal institu-
tions all provided commitment and enforcement devices
that helped to overcome the fundamental problems of
trading across long distances. But informal institutions
such as networks rarely replaced formal institutions such
as courts or merchant guilds altogether. Nor did formal
institutions ever fully substitute for informal ones. In-
stead merchants combined them in complex and often
shifting ways (Gelderblom and Grafe, 2010). Flexibility
was not a consequence of the fluidity of (informal) net-
works that could counter the rigid and hierarchical
structures of the state’s (formal) mercantilist institutions.
Instead the complementarity between different forms
of institutional structures allowed traders to deal more
effectively with the high degrees of uncertainty they
faced.
III
Thinking about formal and informal institutions,
networks, merchant guilds and imperial institutions not
as antagonistic forms of social, economic, and political
organisation implies a methodological challenge to the
writing of Atlantic history. If one gives up the juxtapo-
sition of hard rules and soft ties that seems ill-suited for
the early modern Spains, one ought to think about actors
in overlapping and interacting political and commercial
networks rather than in separate political and economic
spheres. There will be a need to remain open-minded
with regard to the kinds of political and economic actors
that one might encounter rather than start say from a
particular nation of merchants, as many in economic
history have done so far. This section uses a small ex-
ample as an illustration of what this might mean.
The chosen case is the networks of merchants that
connected the northern Spanish Cantabrian Coast – As-
turias, the cuatro villas de la mar de Castilla, Vizcaya
and Guipúzcoa - with the Americas between the late
16th and the first half of the 17th centuries. Their spatial
dimension reached from the Spanish Peninsula to the
Americas, North and South, and north-western Europe,
initially Flanders and northern France, later England.
The cast in this play was on the one hand the well-known
set of Hispanic institutions active in regulating and or-
ganising trans-Atlantic and European long distance trade.
There were the urban institutions of the major ports such
as Bilbao, Santander, or San Sebastián/Donosti. The
territorial political representations, such as the Juntas
of Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa, as well as the king’s repre-
sentatives, the corregidores, played a crucial role. So
did the merchant guilds active in northern Spain, the
Consulados of Burgos and Bilbao. On the other hand,
there were the foreign nations from Flanders, Nantes,
and England active in northern Spain as well as networks
of northern Spanish traders active in Seville, Flanders
and Nantes. More surprisingly, as we will see, these also
interacted with networks of English and north American
merchants and fisherman as well as converso networks.
Northern Spanish commercial networks have been
researched mostly with regard to their indirect partici-
pation in the cycle of activity in the Spanish Americas.
In terms of goods trade in the sixteenth century they
overwhelmingly engaged in an exchange of wool for
textiles with Flanders and northern France as well as in
the import of food staples into the agriculturally poor
northern regions of Spain. Yet, through the Castilian
fairs at Medina del Campo, Medina de Rioseco and
Villalón they were intimately linked to the fortunes of
the Americas trades. Furthermore, especially in the 16th
century trade in the north of Castile and the Cantabrian
Coast mirrored in terms of its formal and informal insti-
tutions those in the better known carrera.
A process of institutional learning between different
towns meant that first Bilbao (1511), and a few decades
later Seville (1543) followed the example of Burgos
(1494) in establishing amerchant guild and commercial
court known as Consulado y Casa de Contratación.
While Seville imitated the Burgos andBilbao consulados
with regard to commercial arbitration, regulation and
the treatment of foreign nations, Bilbao in 1572 adopted
a set of ordinances to govern maritime insurance that
replicated those developed by Seville, which had more
experience in the matter (Grafe, 2005). Both northern
Castilian and Basque merchants equally used a structure
of mandatory membership in the nación in the most
important host towns abroad, first Bruges then Antwerp,
just as merchants in Lima and Mexico were joined in
consulados.4 French, Flemish and English traders in
northern Spain in turn had formal representations, con-
suls and agreements in Burgos and Bilbao. The main
trades in wool and cloth were organised in protective
convoys, inspirations for the flotas and galeones, and
goods were traded at the Castilian fairs, foretelling those
at Portobello.
Beyond the obvious parallels in organisation between
the northern trades and the American markets, they also
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converged directly at the Castilian fairs as mentioned
above. The royal treasury used the fairs as payment fairs,
just as merchants did. The additional liquidity in turn
allowed northern wool merchants to find the credit they
needed to buy wool in forward contracts before the
shearing season. The Monarchy’s payment made out of
American remittances lubricated thus the business of
the pre-existing northern Spanish trading networks with
Flanders and Nantes and propelled them to unpreceden-
ted heights in the 1550 and 60s (Abed al-Hussein, 1982).
As is well known, that interdependence also proved to
be their undoing. When the royal treasury experienced
liquidity problems in the 1570s it had to renegotiate its
debt with its creditors. The temporary stoppage and
conversion of short term debt into long-term bonds did
little to harm the mostly Genoese creditors. But together
with the interruption of trade after the Dutch Republic
closed of the Scheldt in 1576 and war with England re-
sumed they did break the neck of the northern wool and
cloth trade.
Between the 1580s and the 1620s the once closely
knit informal institutions of trade within northern Spain,
between the north and the south and with southern
Netherlands and France disappeared almost entirely.
Networks disintegrated, merchant families redirected
their business or left active trade altogether. The Vizca-
yan and Castilian nations in Antwerp practically disap-
peared, with many Castilians moving to Rouen (Geld-
erblom and Grafe, 2010). Formal institutions, the regu-
lations of trade, the mercantile tribunals and guilds of
Bilbao and Burgos and even the fairs languished and
lost most of their business. When war dealt a severe
external shock to the business formal regulation and
organisation and informal networks alike did little to
lessen the blow. In fact, the opposite was true. Intercon-
nectedness now meant that bankruptcies had domino
effects. Across the entire spatial extension of the net-
works from Antwerp to Bilbao, Burgos, the Castilian
Fairs, and Seville shockwaves ran through the system
(Phillips and Phillips, 1977).
Historians, including this author, have looked at the
collapse of this system as the typical story of a closed
trading system, in which corporate bodies with mono-
poly rights to certain parts of the trade collected rents
(Grafe, 2005; Priotti, 1996; 2005; Phillips and Phillips,
1977; 1982).When the external conditions changed they
were unable to adapt quickly. The organisation of trade
in the north was one characterised by a geographical
specialisation between participating towns, each of
which tried to acquire royal privileges that would give
it rights to a particular part of the trade. The Burgos
consulado had the right to organise the wool fleets to
Flanders; the Bilbao consulado the right to a fixed share
of that shipping business excluding both foreigners and
other Cantabrian towns; credit and tax bills were by
privilege of the fairs due inMedina and so on. The trade
was regulated by the Monarchy, which was free to give
out monopolies, and exclude other participants. The
state supported the control of formal institutions over
the trade and made it more susceptible to crisis in the
process.
When northern trades recovered after the 1620s
the formal structure and regulations were still in place.
But the reality of the new commercial networks could
not be more different. Burgos never recovered an ac-
tive role in the trade, though it made several attempts
to expand its privileges in the early 1600s. The
Castilian Fairs ceased to have any supra-regional role.
Trade became concentrated in Bilbao. The amount of
wool shipped through the port by the 1640s was still
only about half of that that had left all northern ports
in the frenzied 1560s. But it tripled between the early
1630s and the mid-1640s returning to levels that had
been normal before the boom of the 1550s and 60s.
In a radical break with previous patterns practically
all of it, about 1100 tons, went to England. To contex-
tualise the importance of the trade one might add that
this amount was equivalent to about 10 percent of
England total wool productions and England was a
major producer as is well known. A contemporary
English pamphlet estimated that the Bilbao trade was
worth £250,000. This made it comparable to the Le-
vant trade usually considered the most lucrative En-
glish trade at the time.
The new English Atlantic network was the start of
a spectacular recovery of the commercial fortunes of
Bilbao and instrumental in propelling it from the position
of one of the northern Spanish ports to becoming The
northern Spanish port. The return to the general ad va-
loram tax raised by its consulado speaks for itself.5
Why England? The secret of the sudden recovery of
Bilbao’s fortunes was a completely new trading network.
Spanish wool was in high demand in the English West
Country, where the production of lighter NewDraperies
for local and southern Europeanmarkets was expanding
fast and relied on the unusually high quality of Spanish
merino. But English products were not in demand in
northern Spain and English merchants were notoriously
short of bullion to pay for their purchases. At the same
time, West Country merchants were also strongly in-
volved in English North American settlements. The
settlers had but one product to sell, dried and salted
codfish, known in Spain as bacalao. There was no de-
mand for this in England, but introduced in the Iberian
Peninsula by Basque Fisherman since the early 16th
century, it found reasonable demand there. Here then
were the makings of one of the first really important
triangular Atlantic trades.
The networks that underpinned this trade contradict
much of how historians think about the Atlantic. To
begin with, they encompassed the English and the
Spanish Atlantic apparently without much resistance.
In the 1640s there were about 45 resident English mer-
chants in Bilbao, a town whose consulado counted
around 65 merchant citizens at the time, some of whom
were likely ship captains rather than active merchants.
In the sixteenth century northern Castilian and Basque
merchants had collaborated in networks that reached
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Figure 1. Bilbao's trade 1603-1658: returns of the Averia (nominal)
Source: AFB/CB, Libro 208, Nr. 1-11, Libro 210, Nr.13-21, Libro 211, Nr.22-33, Libro 212, Nr.34-36 and (Ezkiaga 1977)
from wool producers, via the fairs, and the shipping to
the point of the sale in northern Europe. Now the
Basques organised the internal supply of wool and the
sale of fish. But the English took care of shipping.
Seen from the point of view of the institutional
rules in trade this is surprising. According to the
Spanish-English peace treaty of 1604 there was no
reason why Spanish ships could not go to England.
At the same time, the legal preference for Basque ship-
owners to take cargo before any foreign vessel was
allowed to ship it, was still in place. Every English
ship master had to ask the town crier to announce his
intentions to take a cargo lest a local shipowner objec-
ted.6 But no shipowner ever did.
In other ways too, the English nation at Bilbao be-
haved in unusual ways. Most lived for many years, or
decades in Bilbao, but very few got married, applied for
naturalisation, or bought property. When they did,
however, they faced apparently no obstacles. Nor were
they keen on formalising the representation of their na-
tion. In the sixteenth century, the relatively few English-
men on the Cantabrian Coast had been represented by
a consul in Bilbao. During the long wars towards the
end of the century, the institution had been discontinued,
but in the 1640s some English merchants suggested re-
viving it.7 They envisaged for the consul the typical
functions: support with legal problems, assurance that
the peace treaties were respected, protection against
unjust taxation, and organisation of the election of a
commission of four Englishmerchants. This commission
in turn should take care of the affairs of merchants who
died in Cantabria, control the business behaviour of the
English, including the rights to check a merchant’s
books, decide Spanish complaints about the quality of
English imports, and finally report to Parliament over
the business affairs of the English in Bilbao.
The pamphlet suggesting these changes was
countered immediately by some Bilbao merchants with
“A humble Answer to a Petition, desiring a regulation
of the Biskey-Trade, by a Consull and foure English
Factors resident in that place, shewing that thereby we
shall not be remedied rather further inconveniences will
insue by the same”. The title indicated the arguments,
namely, that a consul was unnecessary and indeed would
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be harmful. The pamphlet amounted to an astonishing
catalogue of the benefits of Bilbao commercial regula-
tion, arbitration and taxation compiled by the English
merchants.
They argued that contracts in Spain always stipulated
a penalty in case of breach, and that this was sufficient
to ensure proper behaviour by Englishmen and Span-
iards, (indeed, all contracts did contain a clause that in
case of late payment the debtor had to pay a fixed
amount, often 500 to 600 maravedíes a day, plus the
legal costs). Even in the recovery of debt there was no
reason for a consul to intervene. Regarding protection
against unfair taxes, the authors felt that this was quite
unnecessary as well. In principle, this point was covered
by the peace treaty of 1604 and if any problem should
occur it was preferable to appeal to the Spanish Crown
directly. Moreover, there had only been a few problems
regarding particular goods sold on in the interior, but
there was no problem with direct taxation of trade.
The English were equally happy to appeal to the
local justice. They distrusted their fellows more than
the Bilbao commercial authorities, and felt that an at-
tempt to create a commission of Englishmen that would
have been entitled to check a merchant’s books would
be abused for commercial ends. For the English counter-
petitioners, this sort of commission would just lead to
delays and corruption. The Bilbao authorities were the
only protection against this behaviour, especially be-
cause they never forced a merchant to open his business
contacts to the public. Apparently tax collectors, local
authorities and the legal services of the consulado
tribunal were all behaving nicely towards this large
foreign community.
Nor were the English just talking the talk. Rather
there is abundant evidence that English merchants were
suing compatriots in Spain in cases which could just as
easily have been brought before an English court. Legal
documentation available in the Bilbao archives of the
corregimiento and the consulado contain more than 200
cases, in which members of the English merchant com-
munity were involved in some way between 1620 and
1650. The largemajority deals with commercial disputes
of some kind, sometimes between two or more English
merchants resident in Bilbao, sometimes between an
English merchant and a Spaniard. A small number refer
to criminal cases, typically the death of a sailor or mer-
chant, beatings or rape. What is curiously missing from
all these cases is any indication of protests by English
merchants resident in Bilbao against unfair treatment,
excesses of the authorities or complaints about the
workings of the Spanish justice.
The contrast between the English and Basque net-
works involved in the new triangular trade with North
America and the wool trader networks with Flanders
and northern France that had dominated in the sixteenth
century could hardly be more pronounced. It would be
easy to describe this transformation in the traditional
way that juxtaposes state sponsored commercial institu-
tions and monopoly systems in the Spanish dominated
sixteenth century networks with an anti-monopolistic
attitude of the traders in the English dominated seven-
teenth century communities. One could write a story of
the failure of closed consulado regulations and their
mercantilist, anti-capitalist attitudes and the success of
the proto-capitalist English Atlantic networks. Indeed,
historians of the Basque Country often imply that the
exposure of the northern trade of the Dutch and English
led to more market oriented attitudes in northern mer-
chant networks.
IV
A re-evaluation of the evidence in the light of the
above discussion about networks and institutions,
however, suggests a somewhat altered story. The im-
portant difference between the sixteenth and seven-
teenth century networks is not their spatial extension,
here northern Spain, Flanders, and Spanish American
silver, there northern Spain, England and North
American fish, striking as that might be. Nor is it in
the formal institutions regulating trade.TheConsulado
of Bilbao still had the right to force merchants to first
load local ships. The town still had the right to exclude
merchants from property ownership, to apply higher
taxes to foreigners, to restrict where they could live.
The Inquisition still had the right to search every for-
eign ship coming into port for books (and heretics).
Lastly, the informal networks of English and Basque
merchants worked largely in similar ways as they had
done a century earlier organising around common
provenance and family ties.
The fundamental shift was that the Bilbao institu-
tions, urban, ecclesiastical and commercial made no at-
tempt to use their legal rights. This becomes obvious
when comparing the situation in Bilbao with other parts
of the Spains in the same decades through the protests
and enquiries filed by the English Ambassador in Ma-
drid. Complaints about maltreatment of merchants in
Andalusia, Portugal, the Levant and the islands bear
witness to the problems Englishmen faced elsewhere.
But there are practically no complaints from northern
Spain.8
A closer examination of Inquisition files reveals that
few foreigners in the north ever got into trouble about
issues of religion. Local Inquisition officials clearly
dragged their feet when they were asked to report about
the behaviour of the large group of protestant new ar-
rivals in 1632. Otherwise it is hard to explain why they
first responded to the request in 1648 (!) and after some
serious words from their superiors. The officials from
smaller ports in the north reported that all the English-
men were residing in Bilbao anyway, while the official
there vouched for their good behaviour. The only offence
to report was that many of them had illegitimate off-
spring whom they sent to England for education. This
was unfortunate because the poor child’s soul was lost
– but it was unavoidable since the Inquisition could not
afford their teaching.9
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Bilbao institutions of all kinds and the political net-
works that underpinned them evidently made all efforts
to accommodate the English. From the early seventeenth
century onwards the political, commercial and religious
authorities used their power to neutralise anything that
they felt could hinder commercial success. They pro-
tested against the introduction in 1603 to demand depos-
its from exporting merchants to be returned if they could
prove that they had not traded with the enemy. The
Madrid Councils initially delayed in part because of the
opposition and in part because of the peace of 1604
(Echevarría Bacigalupe, 1986).10
Still, in 1628 the Councils raised the stakes and de-
creed the introduction of a shipping register. It was to
no avail. Antonio de Landaverde, the representative of
the assembly of the Señorio de Vizcaya, publicly invoked
the pase foral, that is he argued that the province would
obey the king, but not execute the order.11 The province
of Guipúzcoa was equally opposed.12 The introduction
of registers was stopped until 1641. Then the king’s
Councils tried again to persuade the northern ports to
adopt some measures against the rampant smuggling
with enemy ships. The power elites of Vizcaya now
changed tactic. They agreed to the introduction of the
post of a scrivener, who would take the registers of for-
eign shipping. But the consulado immediately bought
the office for the hefty sum of 5000 ducados making
sure that the officeholder would not bother anyone.
This was neither the first nor the last time the com-
mercial networks of Bilbao had used their money and
cloud to intervene on behalf of their foreign trading
partners. Since 1612, the consulado paid a salary to the
officials of the Inquisition, thus reducing the burden the
visitations imposed on foreign trade.13 Not surprisingly
the documentation shows that the charge levied on
merchants for the so-called visita de navioswas signifi-
cantly lower in Bilbao than in smaller northern ports
and much lower than in other parts of Spain.14 The Bil-
bao consulado also spent much time, effort and ink on
keeping the interruption created by the visita to a min-
imum. Evenwhen forbidden books where found confis-
cation was about the worst that could happen in Bilbao
as it did in the case of an Anglican Bible found in a ship
from Chester.15 The merchant guilds had a similar atti-
tude to other officials who were initially not directly
under its control. In 1660, it paid the royal inspector for
contraband for not coming to Bilbao.16
The small example of theAtlantic trading networks in
Northern Spain in the sixteenth and seventeenth century
illustrates nicely why it is problematic to think about net-
works and institutions in the earlymodernHispanicworld
as antagonistic forms of social organisation, that were
possibly complimentary but in any case fundamentally
different. The early modern polity was in many ways a
network. It is easy to see why merchant dominated urban
and consulado institutions in Bilbao should at all times
try to favour their protestant trading partners. Yet, so did
theprovincial institutions, even if theprovincial assembly,
the juntas, were in fact dominated by rural interests. And
so did the Church and Inquisition officials.
Not even the collectors of the royal wool taxes were
an exception. Since 1627 the only tax directly to be paid
into the royal coffers rather than to the Señorio or the
townwas controlled by a network of converso entrepre-
neurs with Castilian, Portuguese and Dutch correspon-
dents. Garcia de Yllan organised collection 1627-39,
then passed on the business toManuel Cortizos y Villas-
ante, who in 1637 sold it to Simon de Fonseca Piña, tax
farmer until 1665. All of themwere prominent conversos
and are often described as members of the Portuguese
nation (Studnicki-Gizbert, 2007: 151, 129-133). Garcia
de Yllan spent the 1630s writing tracts about how to
improve the commercial fortunes of Spain. He praised
the role of the consulados, as he would, having worked
directly with them in the recovery of the northern wool
trade. Control over the taxation of the northern wool
trademade commercial sense for the conversos because
it helped to transfer funds between their Dutch and
Spanish business activities by using England as a step-
ping point (Kepler, 1976).17 Yet, it also meant that they
too were part of the state.
V
The seventeenth century northern commercial net-
works integrated Basque merchants, wool producers in
Castile, English West Country merchants, settlers in
North America, and the conversos of the Portuguese
nation with their business interests from Madrid and
Bilbao to Brazil and Amsterdam. Political, commercial
and even ecclesiastical networks were deeply inter-
twined. What looked like the juxtaposition of powerful
institutions with royal privileges in the sixteenth century,
the fairs, the consulados and their convoys, the commer-
cial courts, urban restrictions on foreign traders, by the
seventeenth century just looked like another set of net-
works that flexibly engagedwith a new group of foreign-
ers. The “institutions of administration” in this particular
corner of the Atlantic space were the commercial and
religious elites, who crafted, shaped and implemented
(or not) most of what is often referred to as the Spanish
commercial system. Over time the interests of the com-
mercial networks of local Bilbao or foreign English
traders might change, as might those of the political
networks in the Basque Provinces, or indeed those of
the Sephardic networks. However, the latter like all the
others were not the antithesis of the state, they were part
and parcel of the very same polity. Networks were insti-
tutions and early modern institutions were at their
foundations always informal networks.
NOTES
1. Curiously, though, much less research has been done on conversos
who remained in the Spanish reigns. For an exception, see
Schreiber, 1994.
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2. One of the first to think about the absolutist state as a networked
state was Kettering, 1986. For Spain see Yun Casalilla, 2009.
3. This is partly due to the extraordinary influence of Clarence Henry
Haring, “Trade and Navigation between Spain and the Indies in
the Time of the Hapsburgs” (Harvard University Press, 1918).
Haring’s book was translated into Spanish and repeatedly
reprinted until 1984.
4. The comparison here is not perfect, the naciones in Antwerp were
effectively outposts of the Bilbao and Burgos consulados, while
the American guilds were independent. But the important point
is that guilded structures dominated in both cases.
5. The charge was a 1maravedi per ducado, that is 1/375th of value.
For details see Grafe, 2005: 102.
6. AFB, Corr., Leg.1126/085. See also AHPV, Leg.4730/Enc9/s.f.,
AHPV/Enc10/s.f. See also Teofilo Guiard Larrauri,Historia Del
Consulado De Bilbao Y Casa De Contratación De Bilbao Y Del
Comercio De La Villa (1511-1699), Vol I (Bilbao: Jose de Astuy,
1913). Vol.I, 62-4.
7. British Library (BL), 712.g.15/9.
8. See e.g. AHN, Estado, libro 347.
9. AHN, Inquisición, legajo 3645.
10. AFB/CB061, No. 15.
11. AFB/CB, libro 065, No. 59 and AFB/CB, Libro 061, No.4. “yo
en nombre del dho senorio con el respecto devido obedezco la
dha Prematica como mandado de nro Rey y senor natural. Pero
enquanto eso puede ser en qualquiera manera contra los dhos
nros fueros por las razones dhas, suplico con toda humildad deella
para ante su Real persona, y de ella abaxo para ante los senores
del consejo suppremo de Justicia y donde mejor pueda y deva.
y contradigo le execucion y cumplimiento de la dha Real
prematica en todo lo prejudicial […]"
12. AHN, Estado, libro 347d.
13. Initially, it was decided that the three officials would get 2,000
reales per year but the consulado later decided that this was too
much. In 1615, it decided to pay 50 ducados (550 reales) for the
ships fromNantes and agreed on tariffs for other goods. AFB/CB,
libro 451, f.xCvi and Cxx,ff. See also the accounts for 1619/20
and 1620/21, AFB/CB, caja 153, No. 28 and No. 27 (old
classmark).
14. AHN, Inquisición, legajos 3644 and 3645.
15. AHN, Inquisición, legajo 3645, registro de la visita de navíos en
Bilbao, July 1612.
16. AFB/CB, libro 206. The consulado paid 16,350 reales (silver),
9,000 of which were paid for by English merchants. They also
paid individually the highest amount.
17. First documented this trade but thought it was caused by English
drawbacks.
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